
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE



WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 5296-81 21 August 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

63.2

FROM:

Charles E. Waterman

National INtelligence Officer for NESA

Robert C. Ames

Acting Chief, Near East Division, DDO

SUBJECT:

Iran Meeting, 19 August, State Department

PARTICIPANTS:

Assistant Secretary Veliotes; DAS Constable; Kux (INR);

General Secord (ISA); General Gorman (JCS); Ames; 25X1

NIO Waterman

- 1. Veliotes requested a rundown of principal conclusions reached in an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum currently in process of coordination. Waterman did this as follows:
 - -- Khomeini is essentially secure and in control of important elements of control.
 - -- The IRP regime after Khomeini's death, while weakened by factionalism and ethnic tendencies toward autonomy, would continue in power for some time.
 - -- Opposition of the left and of the right is not sufficiently strong to topple clerical rule at the moment.
 - -- The leftist Mujahedin number only 6-10,000 armed elements and are class-based amongst intellectuals and students. They cannot forcibly take control because of these weakenesses. Their socialist tendencies render them suspect for tactical usage in conjunction with conservative exile opposition groups.

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- -- The Tudeh is not strong enough to wrest control from the clerics, except in the unlikely occurrence of a total IRP collapse and a call by a Tudeh pretender government for Soviet intervention. The party is split and tarred with the brush of foreign control.
- -- The European exiles, prominent among them Admiral Madani, require an external impetus to unify. Even if this occurs, they do not at this time have the assets to change the regime. Their effective control would produce some advantages, however. It would establish an alternative in case of a total breakdown of government; permit propaganda in Iran; possibly stimulate opposition inside Iran; and permit us to catalogue assets of the exiles in the country.

 The Soviets find significant pluses in the current situation,	
and are unlikely to intervene militarily while it exists.	
This judgment would hold true even if they received credible	
reports of US backing of exile groups.	25 X 1

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NFAC 5296-81 21 August 1981

MEMORNADUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Iran Meeting, 19 August, State Department

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Charles E. Waterman, NIU/NESA				NFAC 5296-81 25X1			
Robert C. Ames, AC/NE/DDO				21 August 1981			
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